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Abstract 
 
Social interactions are often characterised by cooperation within groups and conflict or 
competition between groups. In certain circumstances, however, cooperation can arise 
between social groups. Here we examine the circumstances under which inter-group 
cooperation is expected to emerge and present examples with particular focus on groups in 
two well-studied but dissimilar taxa: humans and social insects. Drivers for the evolution of 
inter-group cooperation include overarching threats from predators, competitors or adverse 
conditions, and group-level resource asymmetries. Resources can differ between groups in 
both quantity and type. Where the difference is in type, inequalities can lead to specialisation 
and division of labour between groups, a phenomenon characteristic of human societies, but 
UDUHO\VHHQLQRWKHUDQLPDOV7KHDELOLW\WRLGHQWLI\PHPEHUVRIRQH¶VRZQJURXSLVHVVHQWLDO
for social coherence; we consider the proximate roles of identity effects in shaping inter-
group cooperation and allowing membership of multiple groups. Finally, we identify 
numerous valuable avenues for future research that will improve our understanding of the 
processes shaping inter-group cooperation. 
 
Introduction 
 
Across taxa, group-living organisms tend to behave differently towards members of their own 
group (in-group) than towards members of other groups (out-groups) (Table 1). This 
characteristically involves two behaviours that are distinct but often co-occur: 1) cooperation 
with in-group members and 2) conflict with out-groups [1]. While inter-group conflict is 
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undoubtedly common, it is often assumed to be the default scenario, meaning that other 
types of inter-group interactions (tolerance and cooperation) may be overlooked [2,3]. In this 
review, we integrate inter-group cooperation into the broader picture of both within-group 
cooperation and inter-group conflict, using two taxonomically distinct organisms as case 
studies (humans and an ant species: Table 2). We illustrate key properties of inter-group 
cooperation and highlight areas for future research. 
 
Inter-group conflict (Table 1) is thought to have been a key feature in human evolutionary 
history (e.g. [4]) and has been extensively studied in other animals, particularly primates, 
e.g. [5±8]. Inter-group conflict is expected to occur when individuals have shared interests 
with in-group members (interdependence, e.g. via kinship: [9,10]) but not out-group 
members, and resources are distributed such that groups can attempt to both defend 
resources and take resources from others. For example, inter-group conflict can occur over 
access to food and male access to females, as in primates [11,12]. 
 
In other situations, groups may coexist without conflict, for example maintaining adjacent 
territories without aggression or feeding from a common food source [13]. We expect inter-
group tolerance (Table 1) to occur when costs of aggression are high, and when resources 
are abundant and/or not in defensible patches (so there will not be local competition: e.g. 
[14,15]). Moving beyond tolerance, in some cases, inter-group interactions may involve the 
transfer of fitness benefits (inter-group cooperation: Table 1). For social animals, cooperation 
is generally at an individual level, generating benefits that may be shared within a group. In 
addition, cooperation can occur at a group level, where benefits are shared across group 
boundaries; such inter-group cooperation (Table 1) is our focus here. 
 
Inter-group interactions can be classified on the basis of the resulting costs and benefits 
(Figure 1). In this review, we consider the factors that affect where interactions fall within this 
classification, focusing on inter-group cooperation. Most of the current literature on inter-
group interactions focuses on conflict (e.g. [1,11]), so we know relatively little about when 
inter-group cooperation may occur. As inter-group cooperation is not simply the absence of 
conflict [16], the mechanisms that shift interactions from conflict to tolerance may be different 
from those that shift interactions from tolerance to cooperation. For example, within-group 
collective action problems reduce the likelihood of inter-group conflict [17], but we do not 
predict them necessarily to increase the likelihood of inter-group cooperation. Here, we 
examine two ultimate drivers of inter-group cooperation (threats and resource asymmetries) 
and discuss the proximate effects of identity on the form that inter-group cooperation takes. 
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Table 1. Definitions of key terms used in the text. 
 
Term Definition 
Inter-group 
cooperation 
The transfer of benefits from one group to one or more other groups of 
conspecifics, resulting in net benefits shared by multiple members of both 
groups (although benefits may not be equal in size: Figure 1). This 
includes benefits that evolved as a by-product of non-cooperative 
activities and excludes cooperation that occurs 1) between groups of 
different species, and 2) on an individual basis between members of 
different groups (e.g. [18]). 
Inter-group 
conflict 
The imposition of costs from one group on one or more other groups of 
conspecifics, resulting in a net cost to members of at least one group. 
This includes both actively-inflicted costs from direct combat and passive 
or indirect conflict (scramble competition). 
Inter-group 
tolerance 
A state in which groups neither incur a net cost nor receive a net benefit 
as a result of interaction with other groups. 
Inter-group 
interaction 
Reciprocal action or influence of multiple groups on each other. 
Group-level 
identity cues 
Features of group members that carry information about their group 
membership [19]. 
In-group and 
out-group 
members 
0HPEHUVRIRQH¶VRZQJURXSDQGRIRWKHUJURXSVUHVSHFWLYHO\[20,21]. 
Group Aggregation of cooperating individuals that is stable with respect to the 
timescale of cooperation. We use this definition for the purpose of this 
UHYLHZQRWLQJWKDWµJURXS¶LVGefined in several different ways in the 
literature (e.g. [22]) and that in some cases the term is used as an 
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heuristic without definition. 
Cooperation The transfer of benefits from one party to another, ultimately resulting in 
direct or indirect fitness benefits to both parties (modified from [23] to 
include behaviours with a non-cooperative evolutionary origin). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Summary of inter-group interactions assuming only two groups are 
involved, Group A and Group B. Outcomes (net cost / net benefit) at the group level 
are taken to include both direct and indirect fitness benefits across all group 
members. Above the dotted line, Group B gains a higher benefit or pays a lower cost 
than does Group A. 
 
Why cooperate with other groups? 
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The two main benefits that groups gain by cooperating with other groups appear to be 
protection and resource-sharing. Protection from the threats of predation, competition and 
harsh environmental conditions is a major driver of the initial formation of social groups [22]. 
When multiple groups face an increased and large-scale threat, they may respond by fusing, 
forming a larger group that is better able to withstand attack or harsh conditions (e.g. in 
wolves [24], spotted hyenas [13], elephants [25], ants [26]  and humans [27]). Fusion is not 
inter-group cooperation under our definition (Table 1), but rather can be seen as inter-group 
WROHUDQFHRUDWHPSRUDU\FRQFHSWXDOH[SDQVLRQRIWKHµLQ-JURXS¶WRHQFRPSDVVDZLGHUJURXS
of individuals. The original in-group may still be treated differently, although in humans group 
fusion is often accompanied by mechanisms to promote cohesion across the new, larger 
group [28]. 
 
Alternatively, rather than responding to threats by fusing, groups could maintain their own in-
group identities, but actively cooperate with other groups to diminish a threat. All groups may 
play the same role in protection against threats: here the benefits of cooperation arise simply 
from having more individuals contribute. This can occur when the threat is from predators or 
enemies that affect all groups equally. For example, in the ant Iridomyrmex purpureus, 
multiple nests of a polydomous colony (Box 1) appear to engage in combined defensive 
activities when any one of the nests faces the threat of echidna predation [29]. 
 
In other cases, different groups may play different roles in protection from threats, for 
H[DPSOHµULVN-SRROLQJ¶E\H[FKDQJHRIUHVRXUFHVLQWLPHVRIVKRUWIDOOIRUHDFKJURXS[28,30]. 
Groups may also differ in the magnitude of risk experienced or vulnerability to the threat, for 
example from climate change [31]. Differences in vulnerability may arise through differences 
in group size, with smaller groups more at risk. In general the groups that face the higher 
threat should invest more in inter-group cooperation, although this effect interacts with the 
amount of resources groups have [32]. 
 
In sum, although external threats can sometimes promote inter-group conflict [28,33], they 
can also promote inter-group cooperation when groups have some degree of shared 
interests or interdependency. When groups fuse, the interaction between groups is 
qualitatively similar to within-group cooperation; however, when groups remain distinct, even 
if all groups play the same role in defence against threats, identity effects (see below) may 
mean that there are qualitative differences from within-group cooperation. As groups do not 
necessarily behave as additive aggregations of their individual members [34], modelling 
groups as individual players responding to threats may be misleading. 
6 
 
In addition to benefits of protection, a second potential driver of intergroup cooperation is the 
acquisition of resource-related benefits through cooperation with other groups. Many 
asymmetries or inequalities among groups are related to the resources that a group acquires 
or uses. For example, asymmetries in group size may result in differences in the amount of 
resources that different groups hold: larger groups may benefit from economies of scale, but 
may also suffer from greater free-riding [35]. In turn, resource asymmetry may be a driver of 
further inter-group asymmetries, for example in fighting ability. 
 
Asymmetry in resources can take two forms: groups may differ in the amount of a given 
resource, or in the type of resource they hold. Inequalities in resource quantity can arise via 
differing abilities to produce a certain resource, or via differing needs for that resource. The 
literature on the effects of this form of resource inequality on cooperation in humans is 
equivocal (e.g. [36]). For example, theory predicts that wealth inequality between groups can 
in some cases make inter-group cooperation more likely, with greater cooperation among 
groups with unequally- versus equally-distributed resources [37]. However, other models 
predict that resource inequality between groups can be a driver of inter-group conflict [38].  
 
Whether cooperation or conflict occurs between unequal groups may depend on the cost for 
a resource-ULFKJURXSWRµVXEVLGL]H¶DUHVRXUFH-poor group, and whether there is some 
overarching process that provides a global benefit to redistributing the resources: possibly a 
large-scale threat [16]. Resource inequality can interact with inequality in risks from a threat, 
where rich groups contribute more than poor groups when the rich groups are more at risk 
but not when poor groups are more vulnerable [32]. More likely in non-human animals is the 
linkage of (inclusive) fitness across groups caused by high relatedness [10]. One situation in 
which unequally-resourced highly-related groups can occur is polydomous ant colonies (Box 
1), where food resources are redistributed from successfully foraging nests to poorly-
provisioned ones [39,40] (Table 2). This process of resource redistribution shapes the large-
scale colony structure and dynamics [41]. 
 
The second form of resource asymmetry is in the type, rather than abundance, of resources. 
Exchange of different types of resources between groups has been important throughout 
human evolution, with widespread archaeological and current evidence of inter-group trade 
[28,30,42,43] (Table 2).  
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Inter-group exchanges can be beneficial when access to necessary resources varies 
spatially, meaning that groups are inter-dependent with regard to those resources and thus 
have interests in common [9]. Groups that are more efficient at acquiring one type of 
resource may specialize on that resource, leading to group-level division of labour: this 
µFRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJH¶SULQFLSOHH[SODLQVERWKWKHHFRQRPLFVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHDQG
resource exchange between species [44]. When the scale at which resources vary and 
specializaWLRQRFFXUVLVODUJHDQHQWLUHQDWLRQFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGWRDFWDVDµJURXS¶,Q
other cases, specialization occurs at a smaller scale, for example among different human 
ethnic groups: this may arise due to conflict avoidance, analogous to niche differentiation 
[27,45], leading to further opportunities for exchange. The potential for exploitation in inter-
group resource exchange is generally high [46], but can be reduced by two mechanisms. 
First, there are often repeated interactions between the same groups, leading to long-term 
inter-group relationships [28,30]. Second, behaviour can be regulated by strong cultural 
norms (institutions) [16]. For example, inter-group exchange is generally associated with 
µEDODQFHGUHFLSURFLW\¶LHZLWKWKHH[SHFWDWLRQRILPPHGLDWHUHWXUQ[45], and with rituals 
establishing inter-group partnerships [28].  
 
While human societies engage in inter-group resource exchange to a remarkable extent 
(likely facilitated by the ability to establish cultural institutions: [47]), in non-human animals, 
there is little evidence of group-level resource exchange or division of labour. Resource-
related division of labour is common at the individual-level among social insects, for example 
between foragers specialising in protein and carbohydrate (e.g. [48]); the different resources 
are then shared at the nest. At the group-level, however, nests of polydomous ant colonies 
do not appear to show resource-type specialisation [49] (Table 2). 
 
Resource asymmetries are known to play a role in within-group cooperation and inter-group 
conflict (e.g. [50]), and we suggest that they also affect inter-group cooperation. Whether the 
effects of resource asymmetries on inter-group cooperation are qualitatively or quantitatively 
different from their effects on within-group cooperation depends in part on the spatial scale 
of the relevant resource distribution. For example, within-group asymmetries can affect inter-
group interactions [50], meaning that inter-group cooperation may be affected by two levels 
of asymmetry, potentially leading to qualitative differences from within-group cooperation. 
Qualitative differences may also arise due to differences in type of resources at the group 
versus the individual level, for example if a gURXS¶VUHVRXUFHVDUHRQO\DYDLODEOHZKHQLWV
members contribute. 
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Table 2. A summary of the properties of cooperative groups and the interactions 
between them in two case-study examples of resource-based inter-group 
cooperation: human trading groups, and a well-studied polydomous ant species. 
 
 
Human trading groups Polydomous ant (Formica lugubris) 
colonies 
What is the 
nature of a 
group? 
µ*URXS¶LVXVHGKHXULVWLFDOO\WR
include the people who interact 
with each other to cooperatively 
produce or acquire a resource, 
but is often based on location. 
A group is all the ants usually resident in 
a certain nest; several socially 
connected but spatially separated nests 
make up a polydomous colony (Box 1). 
How stable is 
group 
membership? 
People can move between 
groups, but this generally 
happens less frequently than 
the time taken to cooperatively 
produce the resource and 
exchange it for one from 
another group. 
Worker ants can move between nests, 
but most VKRZKLJKILGHOLW\WRRQHµKRPH
QHVW¶HJ[51]) making groups stable 
with respect to the timescale of 
cooperation. 
What 
resources are 
shared 
between 
groups? 
Many, e.g. food and natural 
resources such as metals, 
stone and shells [30,42,43]. 
Primarily carbohydrate food; also 
protein and nest material [49]. 
How do 
resources differ 
between 
groups? 
Both amount and kind 
(resources tend to be abundant 
locally but patchy over a larger 
scale: [52]). 
Groups differ in the amount of foraging 
they perform, therefore the amount of 
carbohydrate resource available within 
each nest [49]. 
How are 
cooperation 
partners 
chosen? 
People cooperate with other 
groups that have the required 
resources (e.g. trade between 
people on the coast and inland: 
Ants cooperate only with other groups 
from the same wider colony and 
cooperate most strongly when resource 
asymmetry between groups is high [39]. 
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[52]). 
Repeated interactions occur 
between the same groups, 
reducing the likelihood of 
exploitation [28,42,43]. 
What is the 
outcome of 
resource 
exchange? 
Benefits of the exchange are 
shared within each group. Note 
that: 1) trade can occur 
between individuals as well as 
between groups, but it is only 
inter-group cooperation when 
the benefits are shared among 
members of a given group 
(Table 1); 2) the benefits from 
such inter-group interactions 
are not necessarily shared 
equally among group members 
[50]. 
Recipient ants share carbohydrate with 
other members of their close in-group 
(nestmates) [40]; the group benefits 
from the resource acquired. 
Is there 
division of 
labour between 
groups? 
Yes: groups specialize on 
locally abundant resources and 
those which they can produce 
or acquire most efficiently [44]. 
At the group level, nests may specialise 
in producing just one reproductive sex 
[53], but there is no evidence of 
resource type (e.g. 
protein/carbohydrate) specialisation at 
the group (nest) level [49].  
Instead, some groups specialise on 
resource collection while others appear 
to focus on exploring the resource 
environment [49], suggesting an 
µH[SORUDWLRQH[SORLWDWLRQ¶GLYLVLRQRI
labour analogous to individual-level 
µVFRXWYHUVXVUHFUXLW¶VSHFLDOLVDWLRQV
seen widely in social insects (e.g. [54]). 
How balanced 
is the 
Generally balanced. If not, 
expect repeated interactions 
Resource transfer can be strongly 
directional where there is variation in 
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exchange of 
benefits? 
and/or cultural institutions such 
as rituals to maintain reciprocity 
[16,28,47], or expect inter-group 
cooperation to break down into 
tolerance or conflict, e.g. if one 
group surrenders its resources 
[55], sometimes under duress 
[42]. 
need [39] but donors may benefit 
indirectly because the resources are 
going to their kin [10]. 
 
Box 1: Polydomous ants  
In many ant species, each colony occupies a single nest (monodomy). Other species of ants 
spread their colonies across several spatially separate nests, each containing workers and 
brood, which remain socially connected (polydomy) [26]. Workers usually show fidelity to a 
SDUWLFXODUµKRPH¶QHVWZLWKLQDSRO\GRPRXVFRORQ\[26,56]. Polydomous species can have a 
single queen (monogynous) or multiple queens (polygynous), and the polydomous nesting 
strategy has evolved many times in the ants [26]. Polydomy may confer colony-level 
advantages in resource exploitation, risk-spreading and colony ergonomics [57]. In its most 
H[WUHPHFDVHSRO\GRPRXVVSHFLHVPD\IRUPµXQLFRORQLDO¶SRSXlations, where all ants in a 
population behave as part of one huge polydomous colony. Unicoloniality usually occurs in 
LQYDVLYHVSHFLHVPRVWSRO\GRPRXVVSHFLHVDUHµPXOWLFRORQLDO¶WKDWLVHDFKFRORQ\LVIRUPHG
of a group of socially-connected nests that functions independently from other neighbouring 
multi-nest colonies and usually is hostile towards them [57].  
 
 
How do identity effects modulate inter-group cooperation? 
 
Once inter-group cooperation arises from threats and resource asymmetries, its form is 
mediated by group identity effects, which may make inter-group cooperation qualitatively 
different from within-group cooperation. In this section, we first discuss how the capacity to 
recognize group membership opens the door to differential treatment of in-group versus out-
group members, generally manifested as in-group favouritism [58]. Secondly, we ask how 
identity effects operate when individuals can be members of more than one group. 
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Humans can recognize multiple categories of group membership, facilitated by cues and 
signals that function to display group commitment (e.g. [59]). However, many other animals 
can also discriminate in-group from out-groups, e.g. by self-referent phenotype matching 
[19]). In social insects, colony-mates are recognised via matching to odour cues derived 
primarily from the shared nest environment. For polydomous species (Box 1), strong nest 
fidelity and limited local dispersal can mean individuals experience differing local 
environments within a colony. Thus, in addition to colony/non-colony discrimination, some 
polydomous ants can discriminate their own nestmates from other colony members [60], or 
distinguish more local and more distant colony members [61]. Certain social insects are thus 
able to achieve up to 3 levels of discrimination (nest-mate, colony-mate, stranger); we 
expect multilevel discrimination to be a pre-requisite for inter-group cooperation (Table 2). 
 
Identity effects facilitated by group membership recognition are taxonomically widespread, 
and generally involve some form of in-group favouritism. For example, social insects exhibit 
greater aggression towards members of other colonies [19], while humans are more 
cooperative with in-group members than out-group members.  This is the case not only for 
µUHDO¶JURXSVsuch as religious communities [62] EXWDOVRIRUµPLQLPDO¶JURXSVHxperimentally 
created on the basis of arbitrary characteristics [20]. Most explanations for in-group 
favouritism take a proximate approach (social psychology, economics, e.g. [58,63]). The 
most likely ultimate explanation is that people expect reciprocity to occur within groups only 
µERXQGHGJHQHUDOL]HGUHFLSURFLW\¶), and thus benefit from cooperating with in-group, but not 
out-group, members [64,65]. We thus predict that stronger group identity effects would 
reduce the likelihood of inter-group cooperation, and that the strength of these effects would 
be mediated by opportunities for repeated beneficial interactions between groups. 
 
The strength and nature of identity effects interact with the potential to change group 
membership. Changing group membership can be costly: for example, many signals of 
group identity function by removing opportunities for beneficial interactions with out-group 
members, thus honestly advertising commitment to within-group cooperation [66] and 
decreasing the potential for inter-group-cooperation. In social insects, transfer to another 
colony is usually rare, because colony-membership is associated with high relatedness - 
although in some contexts individuals may move to neighbouring colonies (e.g. [67]). 
However, in many cases, animals, including social insects do change their group identity. In 
polydomous ant colonies, where between-group relatedness is high, changes to group 
membership are much more common: nest fidelity, while often high, is rarely complete (e.g. 
[56]). Fission-fusion societies are characterised by highly flexible group membership; 
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decisions to change group are influenced by many factors, including sex, dominance rank, 
reproductive status and local environment [13,68]. Many mammals disperse to new groups 
throughout adulthood [69], and in humans, group membership is frequently fluid, even for 
groups based on ethnicity [70]. The potential to change group membership could increase 
interdependence between groups, making inter-group cooperation more likely. In some 
circumstances, exchange of group members could even be a form of inter-group 
cooperation, although in most cases change of group membership will be driven by benefits 
at the individual level. 
 
Identity effects are also influenced by the degree to which it is possible to be a member of 
multiple groups simultaneously. In non-human animals, where membership of multiple 
groups occurs, it is generally hierarchical, e.g. polydomous ant colonies, or family subgroups 
within a larger society [25,57] and group identity is based primarily on kinship and/or locality. 
Humans also belong to nested hierarchical groups determined by relatedness and place 
(e.g. family, regional identity, nationality), but in addition humans form non-nested groups 
defined along many orthogonal axes, e.g. religion and language [71] and professional and 
recreational affiliations. People who consider themselves to be members of a greater 
number of non-overlapping groups are more tolerant towards members of other groups [21]. 
Strength of identification with any particular group varies depending on circumstances and 
context, e.g. when faced by overarching threats common to multiple groups, people shift to a 
EURDGHUµVXSHURUGLQDWH¶JURXSLGentity [72]. In the latter example, the interdependence 
EHWZHHQJURXSVOLNHO\EHFRPHVPRUHVDOLHQWH[SODLQLQJZK\SHRSOHZLWKDPRUHµJOREDOL]HG¶
group identity are more willing to cooperate with individuals from other groups [73] . 
 
Discussion and open questions for further study 
    
Here we show that cooperation between groups, although rare relative to inter-group conflict, 
can arise in a wide range of animal taxa and ecological contexts. Although in this paper we 
focus on groups of organisms, it is important to note that organisms themselves are groups 
of cells, and that inter-group cooperation is also relevant to the issue of organismality [74]. 
Cooperation between groups is most likely when multiple groups face an overarching threat, 
or when groups can benefit from mutual resource exchange. The likelihood of cooperation 
between two groups is also higher when individuals in those two groups are not competing 
with each other but are competing with individuals in other groups in the population; 
however, unlike for individual-level cooperation, this has received little theoretical attention. 
Many models demonstrate that when both competition and cooperation are at a local scale, 
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individual-level cooperation is generally hindered [14,15,75]. However, this theory has not 
considered the opportunity for group-level cooperation at a global scale, an area ripe for 
future study. 
 
Our review reveals many additional areas where further study would be valuable. These 
include fundamental issues of group identity and the nature of interactions between groups. 
For example, where animals belong to nested groups (a close in-group and a wider in-
grouSKRZGRFRRSHUDWLYHLQWHUDFWLRQVGLIIHUEHWZHHQWKHVHWZROHYHOVRIµLQ-JURXS¶"+RZ
widespread (and reliable) is the ability to distinguish between members of these groups? Is 
inter-group cooperation more likely to evolve when groups are linked by membership of a 
wider in-group, or can the formation of a wider in-group be a consequence of inter-group 
cooperation? To what extent does discrimination depend on individual recognition and 
memory, as opposed to group-level identity cues? This has implications IRUDQDQLPDO¶V
capacity to change group membership, and for the cognitive characteristics we might predict 
would be associated with inter-group cooperation. 
 
There are potential costs to being identified as a member of particular group, e.g. the risk of 
attracting aggression, but some form of recognition of group identity is necessary for within-
group cooperation. Group-level identity cues that do not rely on individual-recognition are 
particularly open to exploitation by cheats, so we would predict that these will be used only 
where group identity is strongly associated with high relatedness or where identity cues are 
high cost or difficult to fake. Sub-group identity cues may also be lost if cooperation ± or 
even tolerance ± between groups leads to group fusion; this is expected to happen when 
competition, or other threats, occur at a large scale [14]. More research is needed on the 
circumstances under which loss of sub-group identity occurs, and whether fusion of 
cooperative groups is more likely than of groups which are simply mutually tolerant. 
 
The distinction between cooperation and other inter-group interactions is not clear cut. For 
example, if one group has a large competitive advantage, a competitively inferior group may 
FRQFHGHUHVRXUFHVWRDYRLGFRQIOLFWLH³WROHUDWHGLQWHU-JURXSWKHIW´[55] (Figure 1). 
Alternatively, tolerance of the inferior group could be viewed as extending a benefit, in the 
sense that the weaker group is being given access to a space (or resource) from which they 
could easily be excluded. Further development of cooperation theory is needed to explore 
the relative roles of selection for direct and indirect fitness benefits in the evolution of inter-
group interactions. Where tolerated theft occurs, there is no clear direct beneficial return to 
the donor group (or individual), so the relationship could be viewed as parasitic, rather than 
cooperative. Conversely, if the interaction were controlled by the donor group, this could 
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even be viewed as group-level altruism, although we would expect this to be very rare. 
Group-level altruism / parasitism are additional under-studied areas of research. In 
interspecies mutualisms, it is well-established that the same interaction can be cooperative 
in one context but parasitic in another [76,77], and this likely applies also to group-level 
interactions. Here we discuss cooperation between conspecific groups, but interspecific 
cooperation could be viewed as a special case of inter-group cooperation with low 
relatedness and typically involving resource exchange or shared protection against large-
scale threats [78]. Many of the open questions we highlight here also apply to interspecific 
cooperation. 
 
One major benefit of within-group cooperation is that individuals can obtain resources from 
others in times of shortfall [28]. In human inter-group cooperation, this buffering effect can 
occur also at the group level [28,42], but it is unclear what role buffering plays in other 
animal group interactions. Buffering often requires delayed reciprocity, which is vulnerable to 
cheating; thus, we might expect to see this only where relatedness is high or where 
reputation effects are strong. Resource distribution may modulate the advantages of inter-
group cooperation. Inter-group division of labour should be more likely where resources are 
spatially segregated, and when resource transfer is common, as in humans and the social 
insects. In other animals, some forms of resource transfer, e.g. food sharing, are actually 
rare (except between mates or with dependent offspring), whereas information sharing is 
more common. How inter-group cooperation may function with currencies other than 
physical resource exchange is an interesting area for future study. 
 
Both the ecological context (e.g., resource distribution, harshness of environmental 
conditions, level of competition) and group characteristics (e.g., size, resource holding 
potential, need for a particular resource) will affect the dynamics of intergroup cooperation. 
Within-group heterogeneity may mean the consequences of inter-group cooperation differ 
greatly among members of the same group. For example, if group members differ in the 
extent to which they value inter-group cooperation (e.g. due to kinship with out-group 
members), within-group conflict can arise [79]. In addition, sex-differences in within-group 
cooperation and inter-group conflict occur widely [11,12], so group sex composition would be 
predicted to affect inter-group cooperation dynamics too ± another fruitful area for future 
study. 
 
Our review implicitly focuses on pairwise interactions. While many non-human group-level 
interactions are likely to be pairwise, human inter-group interactions can require agreement 
15 
among many groups, and this can constrain inter-group cooperation [80]. Cooperative 
interactions between multiple contributing groups would be predicted to be subject to the 
same risks of defection and clique-formation as seen in within-group cooperation; this is 
especially true if producing a public good critically requires participation by all groups, e.g. 
protection of clean water. Many major issues suffer when a breakdown in human 
cooperation occurs - including climate change initiatives, conservation and immigration 
management - and such issues span regional or national boundaries [81]. Further research 
on inter-group cooperation will thus not only increase our understanding of the evolution of 
inter-group interactions but can also shed light on developing strategies to promote 
cooperation among human groups in the face of these global challenges. 
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Figure 1. Summary of inter-group interactions assuming only two groups are 
involved, Group A and Group B. Outcomes (net cost / net benefit) at the group level 
are taken to include both direct and indirect fitness benefits across all group 
members. Above the dotted line, Group B gains a higher benefit or pays a lower cost 
than does Group A. 
 
